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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
GNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY,
Plalintiff-Appellant,
-vs.EL PASO NATURAL GAS
COMPANY,
Def endQIY/,t-Respondent.

Case
No.10361

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is an action for indemnity brought under the
specific terms and provisions of a written deed which,
having been accepted, became an agreement to indemnify.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

The trial court below granted defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment and simultaneously denied plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of
Liability. From the summary judgment of "no cause
of action'' thereupon entered against plaintiff, and asserting also that the trial court erred in denying plain-
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tiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability, plaintiff now appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks (a) reversal of the summary judgment in favor of defendant; an.d (b) judgment in faYor
of plaintiff as a. matter of law on the issue of defendant's
legal liability to indemnify plaintiff, leaving to appropriate disposition in a trial court the question of the
amount of defendant's liability to plaintiff; or ( c) failing (b) above, and in the event this court disagrees with
our view that there is no dispute herein as to any material fact, then a trial of this case on the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case having been resolved in the trial court by
a summary judgment against plaintiff, without trial or
findings of fact or jury verdict, appellant now states
the facts as established by the pleadings, by responses
to written interrogatories and requests for admissions,
and by stipulation. There is no major dispute between
the parties as to the facts of this case material to this
appeal; and we think no dispute at all. But it should
be noted that the disposition made of this case in the
lower court by Summary Judgment requires that the
facts be viewed in the way most favorable to appellant,
not respondent. This is necessarily true because the trial
court's ruling, in effect, was that plaintiff could not recover even if the facts were viewed in their aspect roost
favorable to appellant.
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The pertinent background facts in this case are these.
In the year 1955, Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corporation (hereinafter referred to as P. N.), a corporation of
Delaware, decided to embark upon the very substantial
enterprise of building and operating a 22" gas pipeline
running for several hundred miles across major portions
of at least the States of Wyoming and Idaho. The prospective route of this proposed pipeline was, in some locations, roughly parallel and close to the railroad right
of way and tracks of appellant, Union Pacific Railroad
Company (hereinafter sometimes referred to as U. P.);
in other places, it crossed that right of way and those
tracks; and in places, it crossed other lands owned by
r. P. which were and are separate and distinct from its
railroad right of way. In the summer of 1955, representatives of P. N. approached representatives of U. P.
to ascertain whether or not, and if so on what terms,
U. P. would convey to or contract with P. N. so as to
transfer sufficient real property interests owned by U. P.
and desired by P. N. for the construction and operation
of that pipeline. U. P. advised P. N., in substance, that
it was reluctant to enter into the proposed transactions
at all; but that it would do so. But, simultaneously, U. P.
also advised P. N. that U. P. was at that time exposed
to no risks of any kind whatever on account of any such
proposed pipeline simply because no such pipeline then
existed; that the conveyances, contracts, or instruments
which U. P. would execute to convey or to create the
contractual or property interests P. N. desired would be
designed to insure that U. P. would be fully protected
against risks or exposure to risks which would be created
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or arise by virtue of the construction or the existence
and operation of the pipeline; that the liability prov].
sions of these instruments would be strict; and that r p
expected, desired, and intended to be in precisely as good
a situation, under the terms of the instruments, aftor
the pipeline was constructed as it then was before tht
pipeline was constructed, with ref ere nee to exposure tn
possible risks of financial cost and loss. In short, r. P.
informed P. N. that, as between the two, all risks resulting from P. N. 's enterprise were to be borne by P. ~.
P. N. was willing to accept the real property interest'
it desired on the basis described above, perhaps because
of the very moderate prices to be charged by U. P. for
the interests transferred.
Among the many real property interests desired hy
P. N. were perpetual easements for the pipeline over file
separate parcels of property located in Lincoln County,
Wyoming. These easements over these five parcels later
became the subject of the one deed specifically invoh·ed
in this case. The wording of the other instruments or
conveyances by which P. N. acquired numerous other
property interests from U. P. have no pertinency to the
exact issues involved in this action. However, the fact
of their existence does demonstrate the over-all magnitude of P. N. 's pipeline project, clearly outlines the
total relationship between these two parties, and e\'idences the comprehensive and fundamental purpose for
the indemnity provision contained in the deed which i~
involved here. It need scarcely be added that said magnitude, relationship and purpose illuminate sharply what
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appellant contends is the proper interpretation of the
indemnity provision which is the precise problem before
this court on this appeal.

By an exchange of correspondence U. P. twice submitted to P. N. for consideration a draft or form of
<leed containing the precise wording of the indemnity
proYisiou lT. P. desired used in the deed referred to
ahon' : and after a lengthy time affording full opportunity for consideration, P. N. expressly approved that
wording. The deed was then prepared in final form; and
on about l\Iarch 13, 1956, was executed by U. P. and deli\·ered to and accepted by P. N. Subsequently, that deed
ll'as recorded by P. N. Thereafter, P. N. constructed the
pipeline and operated it for several years. All of the
foregoing is shown, without quali:fica ti on, by paragraph
2 of plaintiff's complaint (R. 2); defendant's answer to
paragraph 2 of that complaint (R. 24); plaintiff's resp-0nse to defendant's request for admission No. 9, with
the three exhibits referred to therein and attached (R.
49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 57 and 58) ; and by a specific stipulation
of counsel for both parties hereto to the effect that the
facts sho""Il by all responses to requests for admissions
or answers to interrogatories then on file should and
would be considered as though established by affidavits
(unless contradicted by opposing affidavits of which none
"'ere filed.) made in support of the Motions for Summary
Judgment. Facts thus established were to be taken by
the trial court (and for that matter by this court) as
proved in deciding the merits of those motions. (R. 164.)
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On December 31, 1959, a corporate merger was accomplished whereby P. N. was merged into El Paso Natural Gas Company (hereinafter sometimes referred to
as El Paso), defendant herein. El Paso succeeded to ali
legal rights and assets of P. N. and likewise assumed all
legal and contractual obligations of P. N. For purpost>s
of this case, El Paso therefore stands in the exaet place
of and is the same precise legal entity as was P. X. El
Paso has since then to this day owned and operated the
pipeline, accepting the benefits of and utilizing the ea 8ements conveyed by the deed mentioned abon; and so
admits. (R. 1, 24.)
On November 30, 1963, John E. Stacey, Jr. (hereinafter ref erred to as Stacey), an employee of El Paso, was
driving a truck owned by El Paso in the course and sropt>
of his employment by El Paso. He was traveling to a
section of the pipeline located on one or more of the easement areas specifically described in the deed here involved. While so engaged, he was hideously injured in
an accident occurring on a road crossing over def endant 's tracks, which crossing plaintiff contends was a private and not a public one. (Here is an example of a fact
which, if disputed by defendant and if material, must be
viewed in the light most favorable to appellant.) The
accident occurred when the truck was struck on the erossing, in Wyoming, by one of Union Pacific's trains.
Stacey's injuries need not be described in detail here.
Suffice it to say he is, for all practical purposes, a hopeless quadriplegic. In 1964 Stacey and his wife broug-ht
a negligence personal injury suit against U. P. in the
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Federal District Court for Utah seeking damages of
,rell over one million dollars. U. P. tendered defense of
that lawsuit to El Paso, specifically relying upon the indemnity provision of the deed hereafter to be quoted verhatim. El Paso declined that tender. Union Pacific
thereupon itself conducted the defense of Stacey's lawsuit until shortly before the trial date set in that case;
an<l at that point in Stacey's suit, U. P. settled with the
Stacey's for a total payment of $340,000. Union Pacific
incurred expenses of $4, 707.82 in conducting the defense
of Stacey's suit to and including settlement thereof. All
of the foregoing facts, except the amount of U. P. 's defense expense, have been admitted by El Paso. (R. 2, 3,
4, 24, 25.) In fairness it should be noted El Paso denies
that settlement was a reasonable one or that it was made
by U. P. in good faith. But those denials are immaterial to the indemnity liability issue in the case now
before this court because defendant has conceded U. P.
necessarily incurred at least some loss and expense due
to the Stacey's lawsuit (R. 64); and this court is not presented on this appeal with any question involving the
amount of defendant's liability to plaintiff. The only issue
before this court is whether or not there is such indemnity liability at all.

In late 1964 U. P. brought the instant action against
El Paso to recover indemnity under the deed. Procedurally the case reaches this court as the result of a somewhat unusual course of events. Defendant had answered
U. P.'s complaint; and discovery procedures were being
invoked by both parties. During the course of those dis-
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covery procedures, U. P. submitted certain interroga.
tories and requests for admissions to defendant. To part
thereof defendant objected. When the defendant's objections came on for hearing, Judge Ellett indicated at
the outset of the proceeding he believed defendant should
not be required to respond further in the discovery procedure because he viewed the case as one in which plaintiff could not prevail. For this reason, he iBvited d...
fendant to file a motion for summary judgment. .At counsel's request, plaintiff was permitted to file its own ~lo
tion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liahilit>··
In order to supply the trial court a factual foundation
upon which to consider those motions, it was stipulatetl
that the answers to interrogatories or responses to requests for admissions already filed were to be considered
effective in support of the motions as though the subject
of specific affidavits filed for that purpose. (R. 164.) The
motions for summary judgment were then heard by
Judge Ellett, who granted defendant's motion, simultaneously denied plaintiff's motion, and entered summary
judgment in favor of defendant. (R. 138, 136.) In drfense of the length of the foregoing statement of tl i:
general facts of this case, we respectfully submit the situation is a complex one scarcely capable of too brief
description.
1

The very specific facts here involved are these. The
deed referred to, in addition to conveying the easement
interests, provided in material part as follows:
'' * * * together with the right of ingress and
egress to, from and upon said strips of ]and for
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the purpose of exercising the rights herein granted• • •." (R. 9.)
It also provided as to indemnity as follows:

"The party of the second part ( P. N.) by the
acceptance of this deed agrees to indemnify and
save harmless the party of the first part (U. P.)
from and against any and all liability, loss, damage, claims, demands, actions, causes of action,
costs, and expenses of whatsoever nature, including court costs and attorneys' fees, growing out
of injury or harm to or death of persons whomsoever, or loss or destruction of or damage to
property whatsoever, including the pipe line of
the party of the second part, when such injury,
harm, death, loss, destruction or damage, howsoever caused, grows out of or arises from the
hursting of or leaks in the pipe line, or in any
other way whatsoever is due to or arises because
of the existence of the pipe line or the construction, operation, maintenance, repair, renewal, reconstruction or use of the pipe line or any part
thereof, or to the contents therein or therefrom."
(R. 10.)
At the time of this accident, Stacey had one and only
one reason for being where he was. He was then directly
en route to one of the easement areas described in the
deed to engage in work which, while being performed,
plainly amounted to "maintenance" of the pipeline.
Plaintiff so alleged (R. 2, 3); and, in substance, defendant so conceded. (R. 158, 159.) Plaintiff also alleged, and
ean prove if this court's opinion makes the fact significant, that Stacey was, in effect, engaged in the process of
"maintaining" the pipeline at the precise moment of his
accident (R. 3). Plaintiff's allegation in this regard is
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based on the admitted fact that Stacey was actuallv
guiding maintenance men employed by a contractor of
El Pa.so's to the pipeline when he was injured (R. 60);
and upon the provable fact that Stacey and those ar·companying him were actually transporting tools and
equipment to the pipeline to be used in its maintenancp
at the moment he was hurt. (R. 126.)
The crossing where Stacey's accident oceurred is ,
to be sure, some short distance from the pipeline itself
and from the easement areas described in the deed. Plaintiff has always conceded the accident did not happen on
one of those specific easement areas. (R. 5, 6, 7, 164.) But
it is also established in this case that use of the crossing
where the accident occurred afforded Stacey and the dPf endant the only reasonably practical route over whieh
Stacey or defendant could operate an automobile or
truck to reach at least one easement area which was described in the deed and to which Stacey was directly en
route when injured. (R. 47, 164.) Stacey's aceident and
use by El Paso of the easement areas and of the pipeline
were, to borrow a phrase which this court has heard or
read before, "inseparably related to one another in time
and space." Coray, Adm. v. Southern Pacific Co., :135 U.S.
520, at page 524; 69 Sup. Ct. 275; 93 L.Ed. 208.
ARGUMENT
PRELil\IINARY STATEMENT
Since the defendant asserted four separate reasons
or grounds for its Motion for Summary Judgment, and
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the trial court below simply granted that motion without
stating which of defendant's reasons or grounds it accepted as sufficient to justify the court's action, appellant
must necessarily address its brief to all four of those
possible reasons for granting that motion. It should be
noted at this point that the four basic ideas or contentions
relied upon by defendant and embodied in the four separateh' numbered paragraphs of its motion best lend themse!Yes to intelligent analysis and discussion when organized in a slightly different order and form than the
paragraphing of that motion would dictate. But the substauce of each of defendant's theories will be fully dealt
with herein. Additionally, we mention again that plaintiff contends the trial court erred not only when it granted defendant's motion, but also that it erred when it
denied plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the
Issue of Liability. (R. 78, 138.) To present its position in
both of these respects, appellant will here state its points
affirmatively in support of its own motion, rather than
negatively to challenge defendant's motion. So organized and stated, plaintiff's argument herein nevertheless
directly meets and answers every possible basis for the
trial court's granting of a Summary Judgment in El
Paso's favor.
POINT I
THE INDEMNITY PROVISION OF THE
DEED WAS INTENDED TO PROVIDE INDEMNITY TO UNION PACIFIC UNDER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF STACEY'S
ACCIDENT; THAT ACCIDENT WAS "DUE
TO" AND "DID ARISE BECAUSE OF"
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THE EXISTENCE, MAINTENANCE AND
USE OF THE PIPELINE; AND WHETHER
OR NOT THE EXISTENCE, OPERATION
MAINTENANCE OR USE OF THE PIPE~
LINE WAS A "PROXIMATE CAUSE'' OF
STACEY'S ACCIDENT IS COMPLETELY
IRRELEVANT.
Consideration of the several facets of this point together seems to appellant appropriate because those
facets are so related to each other as to make separate
discussion thereof virtually impossible. That corniideration must be initiated by careful examination of the indemnity language relied upon hy appellant. To simplify
that examination, to emphasize the significant wording.
and to eliminate some portions of the wording which have
no real pertinency to this particular case, appellant no"·
sets forth a distillation of the indemnity provision of
the deed in which the names of the current parties replace terms such as party of the first part and party of
the second part, and in which phrases having special importance are italicized as follows:
El Paso agrees to indemnify U. P. from all liability, loss and expenses of whatsoever n.aturr,
growing out of injury to persons u·homsoerer,
when such injury, hou_;soever caused, in any u·~y
whatsoever is due to or arises because of the en~
tence of the pipeline or its operation or maintenance.
'\Ve respectfully submit that the distilled statement
set forth above, when compared against the full text of
the indemnity language of the deed, is a faithful reproduction equivalent to quotation of what that deed says
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insofar as the words are of consequence to this particular
case. (R. 10.) Union Pacific intended that language to
protect it against prospective losses which both parties
to the deed realized might some day occur because of
an enormous ne-w enterprise then about to be undertaken
by P. N. (now El Paso). Whatever El Paso's counsel
may now say as to the intent of their client, surely El
Pa~o must be held to have intended to agree to indemnify e. P. to the full natural extent of the meaning that
language conveys. 0. S. L. Railroad Co. v. Idaho Stockyards Co., 12 U. (2d) 205; 364 P. (2d) 826. And if that
language, fairly read, does not say El Paso accepts, as
between itself and U. P., the new risks which El Paso's
pipeline enterprise and its juxtaposition to U. P. railroad
operations 'vould inevitably create, then the English language is inadequate to perform that function. Judged
against the perspective and background out of which the
language was born, there should be no doubt the parties
to this case said, and meant to say, the cost of new risks
inevitably incident to El Paso's new enterprise, and fairly related to or connected with it, were to be a part of the
oYer-all cost of that enterprise to be borne by El Paso.
El Pa.so's counsel now contend that company did not
agree to indemnify U. P. against losses due to the existence of the pipeline or its use, operation and maintenance unless such losses were· "proximately caused"
thereby. That contention is untenable. Independent of
authorities which will hereinafter be cited, it should be
obsernd the language used demonstrates in and of itself
that it was not intended to describe any concept of
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"proximate cause" or "legal ca use," and cannot be so
understood. "Proximate ca use" or "legal ca use" are
phrases which, as every first-year law student learns,
connote and describe very real and important limitations
on the common garden variety concept known as ''cause.,,
Phrases such as "howsoever caused" and "in any other
way whatsoever due to or arising because of," which are
used in this deed, are utterly inconsistent and irreconcilable with notions of legal limitations and teclmical restrictions implict in the terms "proximate ca use" or
"legal cause." Therefore, whatever else may have heen
meant by these parties when they used the terms "howsoever caused" and "in any other way whatsoever," it i~
plain the parties did not intend to describe a concept
synonomous with proximate cause.

It remains then to consider what type of connection
between the pipeline and a loss was intended to be described by the parties to the deed when the words chosen
were selected for use. We respectfully assert that the
plain import of those words was to describe pretty closely
the concept or idea which is sometimes ref erred to in legal circles as "cause in fact." Cause in fact is not, in
truth, a strictly legal concept at all. It is instead a concept involving practical analysis of whatever natural relationship exists between two or more events or phenomena eneountered by ordinary people in their everyday
lives. The question of whether or not a stated event or
phenomenon, ''A,'' was due to or caused hy a different
event or phenomenon, '' B,'' is answered by ordinary
men in light of their experience since birth through ap-
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plication of the well known ''but for'' test. In other
words, if any man wishes to answer for himself the question as to whether or not A was caused by B, he consciously or unconsciously asks himself: But for B would
A have occurred? If his answer to himself is no, then
he considers B was or is a cause in fact of A. Conversely
put, in those circumstances, he considers A was due to or
occurred because of B. An analysis of this sort does not
involve legal precepts; it only involves consideration of
the actual relationship between two different events or
phenomena as judged by the experience of a man or of
mankind.
Plaintiff does not here dispute nor quarrel with the
truism that tort law does not decide questions of legal
liability, involving problems of so-called "proximate
cause" or "legal cause," simply by resorting to a "but
for'' or cause in fact test. But that truism is neither
relevant to the problem of this case nor helpful to this
court, for plaintiff here does not seek to impose some
species of tort liability on this defendant. Instead, plaintiff asks the court to impose on defendant an entirely
different kind of liability of a contractual nature which
clef endant expressly agreed to assume by accepting the
deed here involved and utilizing the benefits it conveyed.
To illustrate the point we are trying to make we ask the
court to consider the following hypothetical situation. X
hits Y with a club, thereby killing Y. Y is the father of
a son, Z, two months of age, whom Y has been supporting
and to whom it is entirely expectable Y would continue
to furnish support if he lived. Deprived of Y's support,
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Z starves to death. Any lawyer would quickly recognize
that X's a.ct in hitting Y with a. club was not a "legal"
or "proximate" cause of Z's death by starvation. Ar·.
cordingly, there would be no tort liability in the courts
of this country against X on account of Z 's death. But
if in the situation or example set forth above, X had Yo].
untarily entered into a valid agreement with someone
to pay for all losses of every kind whatsoever whidi
were in fact caused by his hitting Y with a club, then a
different problem arises. We respectfully submit it does
not take legal genius, only common sense and experience,
to understa.nd and conclude that, as a matter of aetual
fa.ct, indeed as a matter of cause and consequence, X's
act in hitting Y with a club did play some part in causin~
Z 's death; and that the pa.rt played by X's act in hitting
Y is, consistent with the ordinary meaning of English
words or language as understood by ordinary men, properly describable with reference to Z's death in general
terms of cause and effect such as "due to" or "arising
because of."
One dictionary definition of the word "cause", which
word has many meanings, is ''that which ocrasions a result." One synonym for "cause" according to the dictionary is "reason"; another is "motive." These words
connote or describe intangible ideas, not acts or thin!t's.
For that matter "negligence" is an idea, not merely an
act or a thing. Negligence can be found from an act
or from an omission to act, but it is more than the act or
omission; it is a characterization of the quality of an
act or omission, certainly an intangible thing. Yet,
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neither laymen nor lawyers nor judges have any intellectual problem or difficulty in thinking or speaking of
such intangibles as the cause of whatever particular re8ult ensues. When therefore it is necessary to decide what
the parties to this deed meant when they said "due to
or arises because of,'' why should the situation be
thought difficult¥ The sole reason, the sole motive, the
sole cause for Stacey's activities and presence on plaintiff's track at the time of the accident was the pipeline
of the defendant, its existence, its operation, its use and
maintenance. Any difficulty in recognizing that some relationship of ordinary cause and effect did exist as between the existence of that pipeline on the one hand, and
Stacey's accident with its consequential loss to Union
Pacific on the other, is based solely on an acquired predisposition of lawyers to think of cause or connection between two related factors in terms of proximate cause.
But application of any such acquired and myopic predisposition when interpreting the language of the deed in
this case is fallacious, for the parties did not think, speak,
or agree as to indemnity in terms of proximate cause.
To the contrary, when speaking of the type of injury or
ac('ident as to which indemnity was to be paid by El
Paso, the parties used the words : ''howsoever caused.''
The task before this court is to determine what the
parties to the deed meant by the language they used, not
some language El Paso's counsel now use. Viewed in
the light suggested by the foregoing, the plaintiff respectfully submits that in plain fact, and as a matter of
the relationship between two or more phenomena or
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events, the existence of the pipeline and the work or ta~k
of operating, using, and maintaining it were im;eparabh·
connected with Stacey's injuries in the sense of the woni~
used in the need. True, neither the existence of the pipe.
line nor its maintenance and use "caused" Staeey's injury in a fault or negligence sense. But what of it~ It
is equally true that the activities of El Paso with reference to the pipeline put Stacey in the path of plaintiff's
train; and in every prartical sense, that pipeline and El
Paso's operations ·with reference to it were at least a
cause of Stacey's injuries. ''But for'' the pipeline, it5
maintenance, use and operation, Stacey would not eren
have been where he was at the time of his injury. In
common sense, can it be gainsaid that Stacey's injuries,
"howsoever caused" were "in any way whatsoenr''
"due to" the existence of the pipeline? Or "arose because of" that existence? The view that his injuries were
not "due to" the "existence" of the pipeline is inexplicable unless one imports to the italicized ·words some
purely legalistic meaning foreign to common understanding. If a history teacher told her third grade class the
Second World War was, in part, due to or arose beca1tsl'
of the existence of the Nazi party, could the English
teacher validly question the statement as inaccurate because "due to" or "arose because of" require a closer
relationship than in fact existed?

It should be noted here that plaintiff is not required, in order to prevail, to make or assert the extreme
contention that every conceivable or fanciful cause in
fact connection between the pipeline and the accident

would be sufficient to entitle plaintiff to invoke the indemnity prov1s1on. Perhaps, because the language of
the instrument is broad, plaintiff could contend for and
establish just such an extreme position; but plaintiff need
not and does not go so far. We do undertake to say
thr connection in the case at bar between El Paso's pipeline and Stacey's accident was real, close and direct. It
was not imaginary, theoretical, or doubtful.
In this connection we also ask the court to consider
the factual background out of which the deed was given.
That situation has been described at the beginning of
this brief (largely from plaintiff's response to defendant's request for admission No. 9 (R. 49, 50, 51). By
virtue of the stipulation between the parties referred to
aboYe, the facts shown in that response are before this
court established beyond dispute. It will be noted therefrom that before defendant's pipeline existed it was the
Railroad Company's happy situation fbat it was exposed
to no hazards whatever arising by virtue of the pipeline,
plainly and simply because the pipeline did not exist.
Plaintiff was willing to convey the property interests
defendant desired only upon such terms as would protect
the Railroad Company against risk of loss thereafter occurring due in any fair sense to the construction or even
the existence of the pipeline. That purpose was communicated to defendant and accepted by it. The language
<leYised for use in the deed was designed and intended
to accomplish that end. Within the limitations for conH'ying human thought which English or any other languag-e hears, that concept was expressed. In substance,
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the language used in the deed said that it did not matter
who was injured, how that person was injured, or whether or not that injury was caused by conduct or even misconduct of the Railroad Company; but that, neverthrless, El Paso should bear the cost of whatever risks
the existence of the pipeline or El Paso's activities i11
building, maintaining or using it might play some part
in producing. The men who made that arrangement
were thinking in terms of new risks and hazards whieh
the pipeline would create. They were not concerned
with "proximate cause", "legal cause" or "fault." Can
it honestly be disputed that the activities of El Paso in
constructing its pipeline parallel and close to plaintiff's
tracks so that, of necessity, El Paso's employes had to
cross Union Pacific's tracks to get to that portion of
the pipeline located on the property covered by the deed
in order to use and maintain the pipeline, did not appreciably increase the risk of some accident resulting in
loss to the Railroad Company1 Obviously, El Paso's
activities increased that risk, if for no other reason,
simply by expanding the number of people who would
from time to time be on or around plaintiff's tracks.
We respectfully submit it was precisely to protect Union
Pacific against whatever augmented risk the mere existence of the pipeline created in that or any other way
that the language used in the deed was inserted therein;
and we also respectfully submit that a man, employed
by defendant, whose only reason for crossing plaintiff's
tracks was furnished exclusively by the existenee and
maintenance of the pipeline, constituted one of the precise risks El Paso was willing to accept in order to obtain,
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C'heaply and voluntarily given rather than expensively and
involuntarily condemned, real property of the plaintiff.
The foregoing suggests what we submit is a reasonable yardstick by which to measure the meaning of the
words of the deed and the intent of the parties evidenced thereby. That yardstick is not one of "proximate cause." It is instead one of risks or hazards fairly
connected with the sheer existence of the pipeline. Those
risks and hazards the pipeline created for the first time
were to be covered by indemnity. Stacey's accident was
the result of one such risk or hazard. With all due respect to defendant's counsel, and to the trial court, we
~ay to this court that to relieve this defendant of the
C'ontractual duty it voluntarily assumed because of some
unwarranted reluctance to interpret the deed exactly as
it reads and exactly as it was intended, is indefensible
in law and morals. The red herring of "proximate cause"
should not deceive this court.
The views stated above are supported by the precise analyses and thoughtful considerations of many careful judges. Please see .Ala. G. S. R. Co. v. L. & N. R. Co.
(1955) 127 F. Supp. 363; and the appellate decision in
the same case, 224 F. (2d) 1. The language used by
Judge Lynne, commencing at page 369 of the F. Supp.
C'ited, is especially appropriate here. Indeed, it is so
exactly applicable to the problem here it deserves quotation at some length.
''A. Proximate Cause
''Pressing vigorously at the threshold, defendan t argues persuasively that the phraseology of
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paragraph 4 of the agreement, 'which may be i 11 _
curred or, su.stained by r~ason of such trains being
detoured is the equivalent of 'proximatr/11
caused by' the operation of the detouring traii;,
It is not oversimplification to observe that, if dPf enda.nt should prevail upon this insistence, the
case would be at an end, since the incident ohviously occurred because of improper operation
by plaintiff not of the detouring train, hut of a
Home Company train.
"The argument is supported by citation of
cases translating the phrase, 'by reason of,' and
phrases of similar import to mean 'proximately
caused by.' It is no doubt true that in some circumstances this equivalence of meaning may obtain. However, in construing a contract it is imprudent to wrench clauses and phrases from context or to disregard the nature of the instrument,
the condition of the parties and the objects they
had in view. (citing cases)
''Here, the words, 'by reason of such trains
being detoured,' are immediately followed by the
expression, 'in ichatever manner the same may be
caused or occasioned, whether by or through the
negligence of the Home Company, its agents or
servants, or by reason of defects in tracks, structures, or facilities furnished by the Home Company, or otherwise.' Entered into between t:ro
corporations moving in an area of comparabw
economic equality, dealing with the familiar transaction of their everyday concerns, couched in the
terse language of businessmen, intended to apply
to an almost infinite variety of prospective and
undetermined events, the contract should be read,
not with the thought of measuring it by the p~e
cision of legalistic niceties, but with an e~e slllgle to discerning the intentions of the parties.
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''So viewed, it would seem that the descriptive
phrase, 'in u:hatever manner the same may be
rn used * * *' was intended expressly to eliminate
the restrictive requirement of a proximate, causal
connection between operation of the detouring
train and damages and to apply the indemnity and
exemption provisions to damages resulting which
would not have occurred but for the fact of the
detour, the existence of additional hazard imposed
hy the very presence of a foreign train on the
tracks in use, even though the loss and damage
directly resulted from the negligence of the indemnitee 's own servants. Thus construed, it would
seem that the clause, 'by reason of such trams
l1eing detoured,' serves the function only of eliminating from the indemnity provisions those losses
and damages in which the detouring train had no
part ,whatsoever." (italics added in part.)

It will be noted the judge relied on nothing more
nor less than the "but for" test to decide what type or
nature of "ca use" or connection was appropriate to
i1ffoke the indemnity there sought. We particularly ask
the court to note the only reason for holding, as the court
did in that case, that the presence of the foreign train
was a cause of the loss was simply that the existence of
the train imposed some additional hazard created by
nothing more than its presence. We can already hear
def end ant's counsel asserting the facts of that case were
different. And in some ways they were. But as an
analysis of the question of what businessmen, parties
to an agreement, mean by such broad words as "cause",
"due to", or "arising because of", the case cannot be
distinguished from the case at bar. As said in that case,
the language ''by reason of'' (which is scarcely different
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meaning to any ordinary p<•rso11 than "dn .. to" or

"a rist>s lwea use of") sl'n·ps only t IH• fu11dio11 of Plim 1

Hating from tlw iudt•mnity pnn-isious thosp losst·~ ;1,

which the rfrtourin.Q train had

part whafel'l·r. Wr shalt
be interested to ht ar this (h•fo11da11t 's counsel Pxplai 11 J1,, 11
110

1

it can fairly hf' ~mid the existPnee of El Paso's pip£>li 11 ..

and itt~ maintenane<> had "no part whate\·pr" i11 Sta<·t:>y·ac<'ident, wlwn that t'xistern·e a11d that mai11t1•11ttrn·r

Wt>ri

the sole reasons for his J>rt•s1·11ee 011 or mw of the ern!-.~in!l

True, those sole n·asons for his Jirt>s<'JH't' tht•r1· did 1w
rause the accideut in a11y fault or Pven "proxirn.att•
cause" sc>nse.

Rut thosp so)p rPasons for his prt>l'le111·1

1

were a cam;(' of his accident in thP only se11sc> impflrtm1:
here, i.e. as a matter of "eausp in fact"; and as ordinar:
men considering- the relationship hc>twN n two sPparatt·
1

events or phenomena speak nnd think of cause and pffort.
In the case of Alumiuum Co. of A mrrini '"· ll111/11

(1952), 200 F. (2d) 2;)7, the Eighth Circuit Court of ..:\ppeals considered a cas<' in whirh an i11jun·d workman wa'
not actually

en~agt1 d

at tht> momt>nt of his injury in per-

formin~ the task i-;peeifieally <"OHred hy a <·011trn{'t

an inde>muity Jffo,·ision.
and gone to a plaep

awa~·

not rPally mat<>rial ht>r<'.

witli

fostPad hC' l1ad stoppt•d w(lrk
from his work sitt> for a

rt>a~"11

Tl11· ('011rt said:

"The situatio11 whi<·h th<' <·ontrad. in<'ludin!!
the indemnity pr<n-ision, eo11t<'mplatt>d was. t~at
Alroa would hP <'arrviug- on its opc>rations 111 1!~
Remelt Building a11°d tli<• <'Ontrador would lw
sPnding- i11 mPn and materials a111l {'lllll'ing tht·
work ~f tlw rontrnet to he do1w in tlw huildin~
eo11r1irrP11tly with Aleoa 's 01wratio11s thrn'. Also.
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that it might he claimed and established to the sati:-facti<111 of a jury that Alcoa's operations were
11Pi.dig-P11t. The operations necessarilv entailed
risk of injury to Pwryone in the building within
t lu•i r n•ach. The indemnity of Article 24 is relatl'd to that risk. The plain intent and purport of
1he> words 'pPrsonal injuries of Pmployees of Cont rad or arisinJ.! out of or in any manner connect('d
with tht' performance of this contract' read in
tlwir C'ontPxt is that the Contractor would answer
for i11juriPs to its employees whom the Contractor
l'ansPd to he within reach of such hazards for the
pnrposP of performing its contract, whether
1·a usPd hy t lw negligence of Alcoa or otherwise. As
thP eontract is not contrary to public policy, illegal
or niid, awl is unamhiguom;;, the duty of the court
is to apply it according- to the intention of the part if's as <·xpress<'d in its terms. (citing cases)
"Tlw stipulated facts establish that the right
awl t lu' only right or rPason Barnes had to he in
.\)('oa 's HPm<'lt Building in proximity to its opt>rations was to do his part in the performance of
tlH· ('011tract. That is the purpose for which the
1·1111t rad or Pmploye<l him tlwre. There was no
abandonment of the purpose when Barnes moved
to gPt out of the way of the dangerous gases
1111t ii t hc-y should he dissipated.
Such moving
out of tlu•ir way was simply his response to a condition of work at th<' place' whPrC' he was applying
a:-hi·stos a11<l no more terminated his performance
of tl11• <'nntraet than going for a drink of water
or to answPr oth1:1r ealls of nature or to fetch needPd tools or appliances or to obtain instructions
or to do anY of th<' incidentals that distinguish
tlw workin~ of a man from the working of a
m:i<"liirn>.

•

•

•

'' "1wn the ordinary and usual significance is
c-inn to the words us~d in Article ~4 and they

are considered in relation to tlw cirl·umstanl·•·s rij'
the contract and the oeeurr<'nr<' of thP i11j11rit•:-, and
damage, it is plain that it was tlw intP11tion o;'
the parties that th<' contractor should d(•l\·nd atid
iwlc>mnify Aleoa against th<' dPma111b mad .. Ji,
Banws for tht> injuriPs IH• snfff'r<'d in <·01111Pdiiq,
with his 1wrformam•p of th<• <·ontraet. Though
the sprc>adin.i: of the> gasl's <·n•afl•d an .-nwrg1·JH·r
that dron• him off his s<'affold tPmporari!Y aa;l
onto th<' traek of thP tran•ling <-ran<·. h" ·11e1w
cease<l to he an im·itP1' of ~\ lcoa who c·anw into it'
factory building and at all timt>s up to thr injun
remained tht>r<> to 1wrform t hp eo11t met. His fligl;t
from the gases was an ineid<'nt of thl' job ari~ing
out of it and <'Olllll'rtl'd with it. A1Hl so \IHt·
the injuries he suffPred in tlw flight and thr d1•ma11d for damages he> assPrtPd 011 a<"eonnt ot'
the injuri<>s. To consid<>r Barn<>s 's adi,·ity till!~
at th<' moment of the injury is coutrary to tlH"
broad and eomprehensin• t<>rms of tla• agret•mPHt
that injuriPs arising- out of or in any mam1er
conneeted with performanr<' Wl'fl' indt•mnifi1>d
against.''
Can it he> douhtl•d tlwt ~ta<·(•y's HSl' of th1· 1·ro~~i11::.
the only practieal routP to the 1H<'H of till• pipt>lin1• wiH'l'l'
he was going to work, was intimat<'ly <·on11P<·t1•d with
maintenanee of the pipPli1w ! Is tlH'l'l' any ho11l'st diffrrence between sayi11g X will irnlPmnit\ Y against any 1 1 1~~
"c.onnectPd with" somp 1iroj1•d awl saying- X will indemnify ag-ainst a11y lol's "howso1•n•r c·aust>d. i11 a11 1
wav due to or arising lw<"Hlll'P of" tht> c>xist(•Jlt'l' nf a
pipeline! To att«>mpt fq dis<'on·r a distindio11 ig-11orP~
not only C'ommon sc·ns(• 111 t•\·1·ryda~· affair~ hut abn
the meaning- whi<'h ordinary JH•oph• int«>rnl to eo11\·p~· li~
plain awl wPll m11lt>rstood English words.
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\\'P 1wxt ask the eourt to ('Onsid('r what has come to
lw
1

o11P

of thP l1·adi11g and most ('ited eases on the subject

if' i 11 d1•m11ity 1·011trads, Co<'<'.11 '"

s.-J F. ( ~d) !li'(i.

l'irpi11iau Ry. Co. (1936)

This case is l'speeially illuminating, we

tliillk. hP<'<lUs1• tlu.·n· is a disse11ting opi11ion espousing and
i·xpn1111di11i: th1• C'Xa('t position defe11dant takes in the

<·n,.1· at liar and which .Judge EIIC'tt ackaneed in oral dist·us:-ion int h1· trial ('Ourt. 111 tlw Co('('y ease, the plaintiff
railroad had grantl•d the defendants the right to occupy
railroad propert~· with a stile. A stranger to both plaintiff a11d dt>frnda11ts usPd tht> stilC' and was strurk by one
nf plai11tiff 's trains. The dC'fondants had agreed to in.J,·muit\ tht> plaintiff against losses arising "hy reason or
i~i <'"''"'''lll"IH'<' of tlu.· oeeu1nn1<·y or the use of the said

11rPmi"l'". 11r tli.· usp of tlw pro1)('rty of tlw Railway Compau~· ad.ia('t>lll thPrl'to." Onp who hC'ard .Judge Ellett 's
n·nwrb i11 till· c·ast' Ht bar (•ould 11ot hut have been imJ'l'•'"s1·d that hi' was h<'arimr an c>('ho of .Judge Parker's
.Ji,.s.-11t: for .JwkP Parker said:
"OklPy StikP was injnr<'d while crossing the
railway tra('ks at this crossin.g, as a result of the
llP!..di!!PIH'<' of tlH• railway company in the operatio11 of OJH• of its trains, and recm·ered a ,·erdict
a11d jud!.,'1ll<>llt i11 tlw sum of $10,000 on aceount
of this 111'~.dig<'ll<'t': hut tlu.• rlaim upon whirh the
n·nlid a11d jud~'1TIC'llt W<'re ohtai1wd was clearly
not 011P a rising 'hy rt>ason or in rom1equenee of
tlit• o<·c·upmu·y or tlw usp' of thC' st<'ps, or of the
<To-;si11g to 'd1i<'h thPy ll•d hut one arising 'hy r<'a"011 alld i11 1·011s<•q11C'11<'<' of' the negligence of the
raihrn~· <·ompany i11 th<' opPration of its train.
\\-l11•rt> 0111• prop('rly using a crossing- is injured
as a rl'sult of such 11<>,glig<'n<:>C', it is not the use of
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till' rrossmg hut thP 11Pglig-e11<·(• whi<'l1 <·au:-t>s thi·
i11jury: and thP claim tl1t·n·upo11 arisi11!! (·11111101
properly ))(' said to ari:-P 'by n·aso11 or in 1·01 1 ~ 1 •
qtH'llre' of tlH• USP of th1· <·rossi11g, for thf'sp t(lrm,
import a <'ausal n•lationship. The use of tlu• rr11~,;
ing no mon' establishes !'ll<'h C'ausal relatio11ship.
e\·en though th<.' injury would not han• O<'<'Uffr·d
but for such use, than the usl• of a strPPt 1·ould i.,
said to be thP rause of an injury (':lllsPd hy a falling sign, merPly lw('alls(• t ht> perso11 injur1'd w11uld
not ha\"e bee11 st ru('k hy thl• sig11 if he had 11111
been using th<' stl'<'Pt. ThP distinrtio11 het\\E'f'Jt
the ram~e of an injury and a ffil'rl' rowlition without whieh it would not han• orrnrrPd is wPI! ft>•·oguiw<l i11 thP law. ( ('iting <·as<'s) And a rontra1 ..
i11demnifyi11g against rlaims arisi11g by rPason or
in ('Ollsequenre of the usP of property ought 11n;
be construed to rO\·er a rasp wlu•n• ti\(' \l!-'1• of tlw
property was not the raust> of the arisiuir of th•·
rlaim but merely furnished a situatio11 in whiel1
the negligence of another gan risP to th<.' elaim. If
it had hN•11 intPrnlPd to irnl<>m11ify against liability for C'laimi.; arising out of injuries rn·cnrri11C'
at the crossing, tlwr<> would han' hPt•11 110 tr1111hl1•
i11 so prO\·iding hy appropriatt• la 11guag1'.''
Indeed, tlw rest of JudgP ParkPr's c·omm<'11ts arP i11 tlw
same vein.

The spPcial signifieRJH'l' of this c·asl' is found

in the fact that the> very g-ist of El Paso 'i.; eoutl'lltio11,
forc('fully stated and lueidly l'Xplairn•d, was rPj<'dt•d outright hy tlw majorit~· opinion of thl' ('ourt.

~\nd tht>

mi·

sons for rejwting su<'h a narrow vit>\\. of what partil'~ !•'
a c.ontract mean by words su<'h as '• hy rpaso11 or i11 ro1 1sequence of" (surely not in eommo11 usa~1· materially
different in meauin~ than "due to or arises hPC·ause of"I
arc> almost a restat<>mPnt of the reaso11s for rnion Pa·

L·itk's positio11 111 the ease at har. In the CMey ease, the

majority opinion of the court said:
·'It i:-; eon!Pnded 011 behalf of the defendants
that th£> )past• agTPemt·nt did not indemnifv the
railway cornpaHy for injuries oe<'urring ;n its
tra<'ks alld <·ausPd solely hy thP negligence of the
railwa~· employees, and that £>nn if intended to
indf'mnif~· against c-laims for injuries to certain
<·las..;Ps of 1wrso!ls the irnlPmnity did not extend
to tlw Stih claim.
"\rht>11 we n•a<l thl' imlemnity elause and gin
to the words ust:>d the iutPrpretation demanded hy
th('ir plain, ordinary meaning, we are forced to
t IH• c·onclu..;ion that the first contention on behalf
of tlw d<·fondantR is not sound. The language used
is broad, comprelwrno1ive and without ambiguity.
If t lu• words us('(} did not mean to indemnify
a!!ainst <'laims of the chararter of the Stike claim,
tliPll tlH·~· nwant nothing-. There was no other
<·lnss of c·laims that rould he brought against the
railwa~· <'ompm1y against which to indemnify.
"This interpretation of the indemnity clause is
1·mphasizPd when we look at the eireumstanees
surrounding the exPcution of tlw lease.
" ·To as<'ertain thC' intent of the parties is the
fu11dam<·11tal rulC' in thP construction of agreenH·11 ts ( C'i t iug c·ases) ; and in such eonstruetion
<·ourt:-; look to tht> language employed, the subjectmatt<•r, a11d tlw surrounding eircumstanees. They
arP JH•\·pr :-;hut out from the' same li1{ht which the
partiP:-; <·1ijoyC'd wl1rn the contrad was executed,
and in that ,·iew thC'Y are rntitled to place them"Plns i11 tlu• same .situation which the parties
who made tl11• <'Ollt ract oc<·upied, so as to view the
,·in·umstaiH·P:-; as they ,·iewed them, and so to
jud!!P of tl1P nwaniug- of words awl of the eorre<'t
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appliration of tlw lang-uag-e to the things dPsrrilwd.' ( eiting- eases)

"I 11 Pllt<>rmg. .mto t I1e I t>asP rontraet tlw railwa,

company was aeting- in a pri,·atP eharadl·r a~ ~
property ow1wr and f'ntirrly outsidr thP seopp ot'
a eommon earri<>r. Tl!(' lt>aSl' was Pntt>n•d into for
a nominal eonsidPratio11 ($1) and soil•ly for tlw
h<>nefit of tll(' dl'fondants. Tbf' maintl'11ancP of tlw
steps rould not possibly hl• of thl' slig-htrst hPTH'fit to the railway c·ompany in any capacity, and ii:
no way aich•d it in its husi11ess, and the compa11y
would evidently not haYe ronsf'ntPd to incur th1·
additional risk of aeeidents from the existrnel• of
tlw right of way for praetieally no rPntal. un]e,,
it were i11demnified in some way.

"It has been repeat<>dly lwld that a railw;,:
company not acting a::-; a eommon earrier may l'X·
empt itself, hy eontraet, from liability for 11eg-ligence. (citing cases)
"The loeation and usP of thl' skps and thl' adjarent railroad trarks add(•d g-rPatly to tlw hazard
of injury h~- passing trains .•\11 Pxami11atio11 of
tlw decision of till• \\'(•st Yirgi11ia ( 'onrt in tlw
RtikP ( 'ase, supra, shows that t Ill• railwa~· v:a·
held liahlP for thl• in.inr~- to ~tikP hl'l'ansP tlH· pn·-·
c>ll<'<' of the stt>ps ro11sP11ted to hy thl• railway ('(>ID·
pa11y eonstitnh•d au ill\·itntiou to tlw public to
cross the traek at that point and cast n;Hm thl'
railway eomnanv nil tl1t• d11ties rn•cessary to a
puhlie erossiug-.
(A /H«l'i . . ·dy "fJ11ira/p11f l"lfll
•

ff(lS QSS<'rft'f/

I

•

!J.1/ ,'-,'fll<"l'.l/

,

i11 Jiis s11if ll,flai11sf f'. [:.)

Tlw <'Ourt held that th<' injur<'d hoy was au Ill·
,·itre awl not a li('PJISl'<'. Rut for thP skps thl'fl'
wonl1l han• het>11 110 liability allll c·o11sl'•Pll'llt lo·~
to the plaintiff. Ag-aiust any loss of this eha~art('~
th<' dPfendants c·nntrad<•d to hold the railwa)
rom pan~· ha rrnlt•ss. Tlw eo11sPq 11P11ces may hP
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harsh, hut C'011trads that are plain must he enfon·l•tl.
''The dt><'isions relit>ll upon on he half of the
d(•frnda11ts 1lPal with irHlc·mnity elarn;;es contained
in 1·ontnH'ts from whiC'h th<' indemniti<'s derived
som1• lwrn•fit, Pither dir<>d or indirert, and thev
an• not C'Olltrolli11g h{'re.
·
'' Tht> eontC'11tion that 8tik{• did not com<> within t lw <'lass of persons eover{'d hy the indemnity
1·la11sP is 11ot sound. The language of the clause,
·or to ot IH•r p<'rsons,' is general and all inclusive .
.\ t t ht> t im<' of th<' <'X<'(•ntion of the lease by C'acey
& II nght-s, tl1{' erossing over the railroad trarks,
down thl' stPps, was inns<' hy the puhlir generally,
and t !1 is faC't was known to the defendants."

\\'1• think it would <'\·idC'nee grave <lisrespert for this

''l'

(·ourt 's ('a pa<' it i1·s to prolong this hrief hy ext<:>nsive qu0tati11n.; from othPr cases.
are therefore content to
('itt> without disC'ussion ct-rtain additional derisions dealin:.r with th(• hasie pri11eip!Ps eontrolling th<:> point under
<·011sitkratio11.

.\i-; to those eas<'s W<' conrede the facts

art> not idt>ntieal, hnt we add these cases are not inserted

h"n· as window dn•ssing. Eaeh is, we think, genuinely
ill1:strntin of tlu• l<'gal doctrine that in ronstruing an
i11d.,m11ity a!.~Tl'{'ffic•11t sueh as is here presented, it is hasil'ally a11d fo11dam(•11tally wrong and improper to ron.-1rn1· words or phras(•s su<'h as ''dne to", "arises he1·a1isp of", ··in l'Olllll'dio11 "·ith ", and the likt>, in terms
of "proxima tl· ea use": arnl it is fundamentally right
anll ('OJ'J't>d to c·onstnw such words or phrases broadly
to effl'c·tuatp thP intc·11tio11s of layme11, who were not at
all ('Oll<'Pfll<'d with lPga l nieC"t ies i1ffoking distinrtions

1
1,

between "proximate causes" and "eonditiorn~" hut witli
the financial realities of risks and hazards of lu.~ ...... In that
spirit we ask this rourt to consider the following:
Ryan Mercantile Co. v. Great Northern RaiJwar1
Co., 294 F. (2d) 629. This case' is, on it's
facts, almost identiC'al to the case at bar.
Seaboard Air Lin.e R. f'o. v. Rirh mond-Pf'fn~burlJ
Turnpike Authority, (Va.) 121 8.E. (2d) 499.
Please note in this case the court said that if
the parties intended to impose indemnity liability for all damage which could he re.late<l
to the existence of the hri<lge involn>d, they
could have said so. In the cas(l at bar th.e
parties did say so.
Priu('emont C'onstrudion Corporation v. B. &: 0.
RR Co., (D. C.) 131 A. (2d) 877;
JJT estern Pnion TPl. Co. v. Fitchburg Gas & Elntric Co., (Mass.) 137 :K.E. (2d) 459;
Northern Par. Ry. f'o. , .. Thornton Bros. fu ..
(Minn.) 288 N.W. 226;
Go1_:ero L Sta11dard Oil Co., 192 F. (2d) 962:
National Transit f'o. r. Daris, 6 F. (2d) 729:
Mutual Employpes Trademart v. A rmnur Serrin'
of Florida (Fla.) 170 Ro. (2<1) 64;
Citl/ of C!Prelan.d, Ohio v. B. & 0. R. C'o., 71 F.
(2d) 89.
An additional comment on this phase of th(l ras('
seems ne<'.essary. "" e had not supposed there was auy
real douht that one on duty for El Paso in the rour~t>
of his employm<'nt, direetly en routP to perform maiuh'nanc.e work for El Paso, via the only practiral route
available to him or to El Pa~o, was for all intrnts and
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purposc·s l'Bg-aged in doing maintenance work for El
Paso. ( \•rtaiuly in the context of workmen's compen~atiou Jaws forneh an t>mployee is (>ngaged in an activity
~uffi<'il'Ilt to he considered'' arising out of or in the course
of liis Pmployment" in even less persuasive circum~taiH·t)s. Please see Cudahy Pa~king Co. , .. Industrial
('111111nissi1111, (iO l~tah 161, 207 Par. 148; and Cu.dahy
f'a1k111.q ('u. , .. Parramotf', 263 l".S. 418; 44 Sup. Ct.
1~>:{;

"L'"

68 L. J<:d. ::lGG. It is really impossible for us to

a11y logical reason why a person situated as was
Parrnmore should he ronsidered as ha\'ing been killed
[11 :lll adiYity arising out of or in the course of his
1•mplo~·ment hut that Stacey, in substantially similar
1·ir('nmsh1nc·Ps, should not he ronsidered as injured
dnr to }wing engaged in his job of "maintaining"
tliP piJ>f·linl·. But if there is some distinction, though we
must say it eseapes us, then it should he remembered that
in its 1·omplaint in this ease plaintiff alleged Stacey was
:1ot only 1'11 route to do maintenance work but also that
Iii> ,,·as adnally t>ng-aged in performing- surh work at the
timt> of his injury. Plaintiff relies in support of this
latt(·r allP!!ation upon defendant's admission that Stac.ey
\\'a" not only en ronte to do work after he reached the
pipPli1)(_• hut also that lw was, at the Yery moment of his
injury, leading or guiding two other men, who were en!!'H!!Pd h~· this df'i'Pndant to do maintenanee work on the
pipeline, to the pr('eise spot where they were to do that
1rork. Ple>ast> st>e 11Pfernla11t 's response to plaintiff's Re1/lll'~t for .\1lmission Xo. 1 (R. 60). }<~yen if Stacey's conil1H·t in going to thP pipeli11e himself was not "maintaining-" th .. pipt•line until hr aetually got there, what is
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to he said of his act in making tlw trip to show tlw precise 8ite of proposed maintPnanee work to otlu·r maiutl'nanee men r If his aet for that purposp is not part and

parcel of "maiutaining" the pipeli1w, in any and ewn
practical or real sP!lS(', tlwn what is it~

lueidt•11tally it

c-0uld and would ht> pron•d hy plaintiff, if nPe(•ssary, that
Stacey and tlw two m('ll hl' was guiding to t hP sitP were
also actively transporting pow<'r ma<"hi11Pry or equipment to that 8itc>, tlwrp to lw usl'd in maintaining- th1• pip1·line, at tlw v<>ry mom<>nt of StaePy 's injury.
There i8 anotlwr factor m this lawsuit whi('lt !ta>
some hearing on the natun' of thP eom1t•dio11 or relationship hetwePn what St1H'('Y was <loi11.!! whf>ll he wa.'
injured and tlw existellC(' or nsP or maintc·11am·c· of the
pipeline.

Th<' partiPs to thP dP('(l cont<'mplat<'<i that El

Paso's employees had to J"('H<'h the PH8l'ffi<'llt areas rorered hy thP descriptions in tht> dPPd in sonw way. Thi~ i•
demonstrated hy th<> <'Xpress wording of

tli<'

1l1·Pd it~Plf

which not 011ly convp~·pd t hP PHSt>ffiPllt i11tt>r<'sts dt>s('ril11•d
hut also mPntimwd "the• rig']1t of i:1grpss arnl P!!rPss to.
from a11d upon said strips of Jarnl. ''

f II Yi!'W of thi~ it

c-an srarcPly lw gairnrnid that thf> partit>s to t hi" dPPd

('IH1·

sid<>red, a8 hehn•<>n thc•msPh'C's, that El Paso's adiYiti1·'
in going to or from tlw prospl•c·tin• pipPlinP to hnild i:
and to mai11tain it

W('J'<'

intimntPly <·011llP<'kd witl1. r·~Sl'll·

tial to, and part of th0 ultimntP tnsks of huilding-. u:o:irnr
and maintaining- that pipPli11<'. 'YhPtlH•r or not Starey
waA using som.-• right of i11grpss or <>gn•ss the· (}P!'d hail
g-rant0d El Pa8o, nPvPrtht>IPss hP wns t>llgngt>d in an

M'·

tiYity which tlw partiPs had ckfi11it<>l~· re<'og-nize<l as a

,·ital part "f maintaining the pipeline -

to wit, getting

to it.
\lor<>O\'Pr, it seems particularly appropriate to impose liability on this dPfendant since Stacey was actually
exprcising some right of ingress co1ffeyed hy the deed at
thP m"m1•11t of his aecident. Please see the Ryan case
eitl'd snpra at page 32. Plaintiff eontends Stacey was
f'Xl'ITisi11.ir sn<'h a right for two reasons. (a) The gen1•ral 111g-n·ss awl e>gress provision of thf> instrument was
11ot !!1•og-raphif'ally limitf>d in any way by other language
r,f tlw d1·1·d. Tlw only practical way for El Paso's men
to rf'~wh the an•a wherf:> Stacey was going is via the crossi11!! wlinP 111· was injun•d and a bridge over a river lo1·att·d lwtwt•t>n plaintiff's tracks and defendant's pipeline
tlwn.. .\ dirt road known to Staeey actually existed on
thP 1·artli o\·pr that route>. ~o other practical route existf'd fnr usi11g that road to the arf>a Stacey was bound for
"xe1·pt <l\'Pr thP <'rossing, so that if El Paso did not use
tl11· prirntl' railroad crossing in question and the private
hrid!!f' mP11tio11Pd, t ht> ingress and egress provision of
1 111· dP<'d was meaningless, as applied to the area of the
pip1·li111· in qtwstion. Please see RNdaf<'mn1t of Property,
\'olnm1• ;-), S1·c·tio11 482, partieularly the comment to
('Ian"" ( C'). El Paso had often used the crossing where
Sta1·py was injurP<l. Plaintiff had not prevented such
ll"'f'. ( R. 44, 4."), Hi4.)
This suggests strong!~- the practi('al C"onstruetion plaeed hy the parties to the deed on the
llil'HJ1in!! of thP ingrt>ss and egTess provision thereof was
that it i1wlndPd somP ri~d1t to use of the erossing. Exactly
what 11amp a n•al property lawyPr would gfre that right
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is not important. Restatement of Property, Volume 5
'
Section 483, and particularly the comment to Clause (d)
thereof. (b) But of even greater significance, the deed
from Union Pacific almost surely carried with it to El
Paso some right to cross plaintiff's tracks at the crossino·
in question by implication under well established principles of law, 'vhether or not Union Pacific subjectiveh
so intended and whether or not the ingress and egress
language of the deed was itself legally sufficient to accomplish that result. Please see the Restatement of
Property, Volume 5, Section 47 4; the comment to Clause
(b) of Section 475, which points out that a conveyance of
a particular easement interest may by implication and
as incidental thereto create another easement interest of
whatever sort is necessary to reach the easement area
specifically conveyed; Section 476, together with all comment and illustrations included therewith and partic11larly Comment (g) thereof. And whether El Paso
acquired some right to use the crossing by virtne of (a)
the ingress and egress provision of the deed or (b) l1!t
implication, the extent of that right was subject to normal development of the use of the pipelinr itself. Rl'staf ernent of Property, Volume 5, Section 484, and particularly Comment (b). Will this defendant nm,- say
Stacey's use of this crossing at the time of his accident
was not a "normal development" of that use~
~

Of course, vVyoming Ia-w would he controlling on
the nature of whatever right El Paso had to use the private railroad crossing where Stacey was injured. But wr
can find no vVyoming statutes or cases which apprar sig-

nificant in this respect. In such circumstances the doctrines of the Restatement become particularly persuasive.
It may he added this court has accepted at least some of
the Restatement views cited above. Please see Adamson
':. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P. (2d) 264; Wood v. Ashby, 122 Utah 580, 253 P. (2d) 351. We mention all of the
foregoing matters first, as we have said, because it is
appropriate to impose liability upon this defendant since
El Paso was using some right which actually grew out of
the deed when Stacey used the crossing where he was
hurt. But secondly, we also think these matters have real
significance in determining what the parties meant and
should he held to have meant by the words ''due to or
arises be ca use of" used in the indemnity provision of
the deed. If the parties to that instrument in fact contemplated use by El Paso of the private railroad crossing, or e\·en if it is true that principles of law require it
to be assumed those parties considered that possibility
so that l1nion Pacific in fact granted a right to use the
(Tossing despite the fact neither party ever actually
thought of the matter at all, is it not altogether reasonalile to eonclude the parties intended to eo,·er indemnity
for losses arising from use of the crossing by El Paso
for its own purposes when they used the broad language,
''due to or arises because of", in the indemnity provision of the deed? For if the purpose of the indemnity
pnn·ision of the deed was to protect Union Pacific against
all risk of Joss arising ewn from the e:ristente of the
pipeline, and such purpose is transparent from the lang-nage used and the whole situation here, then the hazards
of use of the crossing "·erc> an inseparable part of the
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total increased risks which the existence of the pipeline
created.
In summarizing this point of this brief, we ask the
court to take into account the following fundamental
considerations :

1. The real issue to be decided here require8 determination of what the parties to the deed meant by thP
words used.
2. Those parties were and are practical and actiYe
business corporations, not theorists in some fairyland.
The plaintiff operates a railroad; the defendant operate~
major pipelines. The representatives of those partie~
who negotiated and consummated the transaetion culminating in the deed here involved were not interested at
all in legal philosophies. They knew that a major pipeline to be constructed alongside or close to a railroad
track over miles of distance would inescapabl~- create
new risks and hazards of loss and injury; that the exact
methods or ways in which such losses or injuries might
occur ·were infinite in number and in Yariety; aud that
neither they nor anyone else could foresee all the possible ways those losses could or would occur. But one
such risk which mn8t have occurred to them wa8 the hnard created when people connected in some direct \rn.r
with the construction or the maintenance or e\·en thr
existence of the pipeline came ph~·sicall~- near or onto
the railroad company's tracks. Any drnia1 of that statement charges those men with blinding themseln•s to experience.
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3. The representatives of the parties to this deed
were not concerned "''ith and did not care about such
legal problems as are inherent in the doctrine of "proximate cause." Indeed, if they had bothered to study that
subject at all they would have learned, as every lawyer
knows, that issues of proximate cause are in nearly all
cases submitted to the vagaries of decision by juries
after loss or damage has already occurred. These parties did not choose to rely on what a jury might decide
about any such question of proximate cause when it
came to placing the cost of an accomplished loss as between themselves.
4. The parties framed the indemnity liability El
Paso was agreeing to accept in the very broadest of
terms, using phrases and words such as ''any and all
linhilit:·", of whatsoever nature", "harm to persons
whomsoe,·er", "damage, howsoever caused", "or in any
other \Yay whatsoever", and "is due to or arises hecause
of.'~ They then catalogued and listed every noun descriptive of any activity of El Paso which might thereafter occur with reference to the pipeline, adding e\·en
the "existence" of the same. Broader description of
the general gamut of the newly born hazards which El
Paso was to accept the risk and duty of paying for is
difficult to conceive.
5. The parties expressed their intent hy means
neither obscure nor uncertain. No deceptive or unfamiliar words were employed. And those words these
parties used should now be construed to accomplish what
they intended; not what a lawyer or even a judge now
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thinks the parties ought or should have intended. To
construe this indemnity provision in violation uf its ·wording so as to allow El Paso to escape the indemnitv liability it agreed to assume is to reject the right of two
major corporations, who knew exactly what they were
doing, to agree between themselves how losses sure to
occur in the years ahead should be dea1t with.

POINT II
THE INDEMNITY LANGUAGE USED
HERE APPLIES TO A LOSS SUSTAINED
BY PLAINTIFF EVEN IF THAT LOSS WAS
PROXIMATELY CAUSED, IN PART, BY
PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE.
The clef endant asserts the indemnity language here
under consideration was not intended to apply and does
not apply to eover any loss from any accident proximately
caused, even in part, by this plaintiff's o-wn negligence.
In so contending, defendant is asking this court to return
to the days of the 18th Century when form in a legal instrument or pleading was everything and substance
counted for nothing. But those days are golle without
lament. True, the indemnity provision of the deed dM~
not use the vrnrcl "negligence." But seyeral of the cases
we have cited above have thoroughly discussed wording
of other instruments having the same claimed deficienc».
and have rejected defendant's contention. And on this
particular point, plaintiff need not rely exclusiYely on
decisions from jurisdictions other than \V;'oming dealing with the question. The answer to the defendant'~
contention has been furnished hy a "\Vyoming federal
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judge, applying -Wyoming law, to a -Wyoming case; and
if the law of --Wyoming in that respect is ascertainable,
surely it governs the case at bar. In C. & N. TV. Ry. Co.
v. Rissler (1960), 184 F. Supp. 98, the defendant there
eontended, as does the defendant here, that an indemnity
agreement does not cover a loss caused by the indemnitee 's negligence unless its language, in haec verba, provides that indemnity is recoverable even though the indemnitee was guilty of negligence causing the loss. In
rejecting that contention the Wyoming federal court,
<1uoting from another decision, said:

"It seems clear that it is not necessary that the
parties make use of the word 'negligence' in a provision in order to make the provision applicable
to a party's own negligence and that it is sufficient
if the parties by 'apt language' include such negligence.''
In the case at bar the indemnity provision of the deed
specifically says that it shall cover "all liability, loss,
etc." ... when such loss "howsoever caused" is due to or
arises because of even the existence of the pipeline. It
defies common sense and glorifies form instead of sub~tance to say that this broad language does not cover a
loss merely because negligence of the railroad company
may also have been a cause thereof. Does not ''all''
still mean ''all''? At least as to injuries sustained by
third persons (certainly such injuries are included in
the term used in the deed: ''injury ... of persons whomsoe cer") Union Pacific would not even be initially liable
to sueh third person unless the railroad company was itself negligent. Therefore, to read the indemnity Ian-
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guage of the deed here as applicable only when no negligence of the railroad company contributed to whatever
loss has been sustained by such third person is to say
the parties to this deed engaged in idle chatter when
they expressly said that the indemnity provided should
cover ''all losses'' sustained by ''persons whomsoever.''
Nor can the provision in the deed for indemnity for losses
"howsoever caused" be interpreted reasonably to exclude losses caused in whole or in part by negligence of
the railroad company. ''Howsoever caused'' still means
"howsoever ca used" does it not? Accordingly, this defendant's contention that the parties to this deed nHer
intended to provide for indemnit:· coYerage on losses
caused by Union Pacific's negligence asks this court to
strike from the deed the words quoted above; or, in the
alternative, to ignore them.
This court has not taken a different view. In Barrus
v. lVilkinson, ____ U. (2d) ____ , 398 P. (2d) 207, decided by
this court in January, 1965, this court recognized that
what is important on a question of this sort is whether or
not the intention to cover losses caused hY an indemnitee 's own negligence is clearly and unequi,·ocally expressed. But no magic word or precise ''formula'' wa~
said by this court to be necessary. And the intent for El
Paso to indemnify U. P. for "all losses" ... "howsoever caused" (surely including losses caused in part li:U. P. negligence) is clearly and unequivocally set forth
in the deed at hand here.
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Modern decisions from many other courts are in
accord. Plea8e see Stern v. Larocca, (N.J.) 140 A. (2d)
403, where the court said at page 407:
"B~ the overwhelming weight of authority,
8omethmg less than an express reference in the
contract to losses from the indemnitee 's negligence as indemnifiable will suffice to make them
so if the intent otherwise sufficiently appears from
language and circumstances.''

And please see also Rice v. Pennsylvania R. Company, 202 F. (2d) 861; J. V. McNicholas Transfer Company v. Pennsylrania R. Company, 154 F. (2d) 265; Jackson'l'ille Term. Company v. REA, Inc., 296 F. (2d) 256;
Princemont Construction Corp. v. B. & 0. R.R. Company,
(D. C.) 131 A. (2d) 877, already cited, supra; Alamo
Lumber Company v. 1Varren Pet. Corp., 316 F. (2d) 287.
POINT III
THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT INVOLVED HERE IS VALID AND IS NOT
VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE AS
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.
Defendant asserted in its ~lotion that the indemnity
provision before this court is ''void and unenforceable
as against public policy.'' This contention is absolute
and utter nonsense, deserving of no extended response.
For Wyoming, Judge Kerr answered defendant's
public policy argument in the Rissler case, cited above,
with his remarks at page 101 of 184 F. Supp. So many
other courts have given the same ans\\·er to that argu-
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ment in reeent years it is almost beyond
counsel for defendant included this point
for Summary Judgment. A few of the
jecting defendant's eontention in this
follows:

belief that able
in their Motion
many cases reregard are as

Minneapolis-Moline Company v. Chicago, M., St.
Paul and P. Ry. Company, 199 F. (2d) 725 at
page 729, and as Point 2 in that opinion;
Indemnity Insurarnce Company of North America
v. Koontz-Wagner Electric Company, 233 F.
(2d) 380 at page 383;
Northern Pacific Ry. Company v. Thornton Bros.
Co., ( 1\Iinn.) 288 N."T· 226 at page 228;
Pettit Grain & Potato Company v. Northern Pacific Ry. Company. (Minn.) 35 N.W. (2d) 12i
at pages 132 and 133 as Points (11) and (12)
of that opinion;
James Stewart & Company v. Mobley, (Tex.) 282
S.W. (2d) 290 at page 293 as Point 1 of that
op1mon.
Prolonged discussion of this particular suhject or
citation of additional authorities seems unnecessary at
this point. The plain fact is this clef endant has llPYer
even alleged, much less attempted to establish how it
eould in fact be true, that plaintiff was acting as a common carrier or in the exereise of any legal dut;- a:;: <I
common carrier when it made and delivered tlie deed i11
question to the defendant, merely because it often does
act as a common carrier. Obviously, the real reasoll for
the defendant's failure in these respects is that the plaintiff was not so acting as a common carrier in giYin~t th€
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Jeed. It was simply acting as the proprietor of land.
1Iodern courts, appreciative of what has been and is now
happening to tort liability law in today's cases, are
simply refusing to hold that it is against public policy
for a person or corporation to protect himself or itself
against his own or its own conduct, negligent or otherwise, by liability insurance or by indemnity agreements,
unless very special conditions not existing here justify
a <.lifferent ruling.
POINT IV
THERE vVAS CONSIDERATION FOR THE
INDEMNITY AGREEMENT.
Defendant's suggestion, stated m its Answer and
repeated in its Motion for Summary Judgment, that there
was no consideration for whatever indemnity liability defendant assumed by accepting the deed is the most feeble
of all the defendant's contentions. By its request for
admission N" o. 4, plaintiff asked def end ant to admit in
this case:
"That in return for said deed, Exhibit 'A,'
and in return for whatever contractual obligations were thereby assumed by defendant and its
predecessor in interest under the indemnity provisions of said Exhibit 'A,' said defendant and its
predecessor in interest received from plaintiff
some consideration having a substantial tangible
value consisting of easements for said pipeline
over the several strips of real property described
in said Exhibit 'A,' together with at least some
right of ingress and egress to and from said strips
of real property over other lands of the plaintiff.''
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Defendant answered that request under oath as follows : ''Admitted.'' In view of this admission, we do not
propose to dignify this point with further argument.
CONCLUSION
In candor we now acknowledge defendant's counsel
can and probably will cite to this court some decisions
which are, at least on cursory examination, contrary to
plaintiff's position herein. Some of those decision8 \rill
be old. Any modern cases of that sort are, we respectfully submit, the vestigial remains of an ancient judicial
hostility to enforcement of indemnity agreements. That
hostility was conceived and nurtured to maturity in a clay
when tort liability law was a far different thing than it
is today. Every judge and lawyer who deals \Yith negligence and liability law today knows, whether he admits it aloud or not, that the negligence or fault concepts
of even twenty-five years ago are scarcely recognizable
against the same concepts as applie(l toda:·. \Yhether one
agrees or disagrees with that trend, ne\·ertheless it i8 true
our law tends more and more to what is sometimes spoh11
of as "enterprise liability." And that is due to ·what
Professors Harper and James refer to as principles of
''Social Insurance'' II Harper & James, The Law of Torts.
Chapter XIII, particularly page 784. Hostilit>- in onr
courts to enforcement of indemnity agreements at a timr
when negligence liability was only imposed for nry real
"fault" was one thing. Such hostility today when liability is often imposed for far different and less blameworthy reasons, is another. For ordinary people, anil
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aYerage business men, know what has been and is happening in accident cases; and railroads know of it. Laymen may not know the philosophical or social reasons
for the judicial evolution or revolution which has been
and is occurring in tort liability law; but they observe
its eonsequences in more and bigger judgments. As a
consequence they very naturally try to protect themselves against hazards of financial loss, when possible,
Ly rnrious methods including insurance, indemnity agreements, and even insurance covering indemnity liabilities
assumed by contract. Surely ths court is aware that
what is said above is true. To erect judicial barricades
against this natural and almost inevitable development
in our society, due to some outworn hostility to enforcement of indemnity agreements, simply because that hostility may have had a moral basis in bygone days should
not he the function of our courts. In other words, we
respectfully submit to this court that developments in
accident and tort liability law warrant a sensible and
reafoitic mental approach by our courts in deciding these
iml1'mnity cases, not a technical or hostile attitude. For
if the doctrines of "enterprise liability" are more and
more to be applied in negligence and accident cases, and
we all know that is happening, then what is shocking or
unfair or even harsh in holding to its bargain this def endant company ·which agreed to accept indemnity liability
iuC'ident to its enterprise'? 1Ve also respectfully ask this
court to accept the modern and enlightened Yiews so well
stated by .T udge Lynne in the L&N case first cited in this
lJrief, and by the many other judges whose decisions
h<ffe been ref erred to herein. To do otherwise would be
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l

to inhibit, almost out of sheer superstition, the logical
response of many members of our society to the developments and changes in tort liability law which go on
about us apace. Cozzi v. Owens Corning Fiber Glass
Corp. (N.J.) 164 A. (2d) 69.
Plaintiff therefore asks this court to reverse the
Summary Judgment against it ; and to direct judgment in
the trial court granting plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment on the Issue of Liability. Should this court
agree with us that defendant was not entitled to a Summary Judgment, but disagree with us that plaintiff is
entitled to a Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability, then the judgment should be reversed and the case
returned to the district court for trial. \Ve say in this
latter regard, ho\vever, that we believe the real choices
before this court are to affirm the judgment below or to
direct the entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff on
the issue of liability, leaving to determination at a trial
the amount of such liability.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN P. LEVERICH
A. U. MINER
HOWARD F. CORAY
SCOTT 1\L MATHESON
NORMANW. KETTNER
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
404 Union Pacific Building
Salt Lake Cit~-, Utah
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